Abstract-We consider hybrid systems with LTI continuous dynamics under collaborative control, that is, for which some events and inputs are controlled solely by a human operator and other events and inputs are controlled by the automation. The user-interface is a device through which the output of the system can be observed, and inputs from the human can be initiated. We model the user as an observer with additional requirements beyond a standard (automated) observer. We state conditions for user-observability and user-predictability to evaluate whether a given user-interface provides the user with adequate information to complete a desired task. We apply these conditions to two examples in aircraft flight management systems.
Observability of User-Interfaces for Hybrid LTI Systems Under Collaborative Control: Application to Aircraft Flight Management Systems (in which the human simply cannot use the information presented in a display because too much information is provided), human error, and other complex and non-intuitive phenomena.
In the 1997 fatal test flight of the A-330 in Toulouse, France [1] , the pilot attempted a go-around (e.g., an aborted landing) with a simulated engine failure, but an unanticipated combination of aircraft and engine dynamics, flight envelope protection schemes, and confusing interface indications led to the aircraft's stall. A "decluttering" scheme significantly reduced the amount of information provided through the display, and the pilot was unable to deduce that flight envelope protection laws had been engaged. Providing the correct information to the user is necessary for effective human-automation interaction.
Here, we consider hybrid systems under shared control (in which both the automation and the human each have separate control inputs to the system), extending work in LTI systems under shared control [2] , [3] and immediate observability of discrete event systems [4] . We consider the human operator to be a special type of observer, with additional constraints due to limits of human performance (memory, information processing, situational awareness) and guidelines for "good" human-automation interaction. We presume that the user-interface allows the user to observe information about the system and to enact various control inputs. We pose the question of information correctness as one of observability and predictability from the user's point of view: Does the information content provided in the user-interface allow the human to reconstruct information about the state of the system? Observability concepts for autonomous [5] [6] [7] and nonautonomous [8] , [9] linear hybrid systems consider the availability of a variety of discrete and continuous information and switching schemes. We focus on systems with known switching logic, but with some inputs (both continuous and discrete) unknown to the user, e.g., due automation control authority (in envelope protection or anti-saturation schemes) or the presence of other users (the pilot and the co-pilot). We draw in particular on notions from [5] , [7] , and from [6] , in which information about discrete and continuous outputs are handled sequentially to infer the hybrid state. Recent work [10] [11] [12] on observer design for linear hybrid systems with unknown continuous inputs infers the unknown input. In contrast, we seek to determine, irrespective of the unknown input, whether information provided to the user is adequate for the purpose of completing a specified task.
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Potential sources of mode confusion [13] in aircraft flight management systems have been identified through model checking [14] , finite state machine composition [15] , and other verification techniques [16] , and extended to discrete abstractions of hybrid systems [17] , [18] . Methods for user-interface design [19] , [20] with continuous components [21] have also been explored. More recently [22] , work has focused on modeling [23] , [24] and estimating [25] , [26] the human.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a well-posed hybrid system [27] , with discrete mode , continuous state , discrete event , continuous input , discrete transition function (with identity reset map), and continuous dynamics (1) where is the user's input and are the unknown inputs (from the automation and from other users). Transitions may be controlled by the user, by other users, or by the automation (and may be state-based). The user-interface is represented by the hybrid output map , (2) with discrete elements and continuous elements . Discrete events are categorized according to whether or not they are observable or unobservable to the user . State-based transitions may fall into either category, depending on whether they are annunciated to the user and the user is aware of the event. Consider a push-button input to engage the autopilot in a civil jet aircraft with two pilots; if this event is only annunciated to the user that initiates it, then for the initiating pilot and for the noninitiating pilot. The interface should allow the user to uniquely reconstruct the current state and predict the next state, for those states relevant for the task, despite the limited information available to the user. Guidelines for human-centered design [28] , [29] recommend that interfaces not require the user to remember past configurations. Further, for the user to be able to trust the automation, it must be predictable. We define the user-observable subspace as those states that can be uniquely reconstructed and the user-predictable subspace as those states from which the next state can be uniquely predicted. We presume that the user should not be required to recall past observable events but can, in some cases, know the next observable event. (Consider aircraft flight management systems in which anticipated modes are displayed along with current modes.) We also presume the user is trained, experienced (and hence knowledgeable about the system dynamics), and capable of perceiving information about the user input, the output and some derivatives of the user input and the output [2] .
Assumption 1: The user knows:
1) the discrete output ; 2) the continuous output and derivatives ; 3) how the observed input affects the plant, i.e., the user knows and the next observable event , but not derivatives , or , . We define the task as safety or liveness specifications, e.g., conditions that must always be met, or must be eventually met [2] , that involve states in the observable subspace of (1). For example, tasks for a remotely driven vehicle could be Always travel under the speed limit, or When the light turns red, stop at the intersection. We define the task space as those states relevant for completion of the task. That is, for tasks involving continuous elements in mode with , e.g., the row space of [2] , [3] . For a task with task space to be accomplished, all elements of should be observable and predictable by the user.
Problem 1: Determine whether the human-automation system (1) with user-interface (2) provides the user with adequate information to successfully accomplish a task with task space , by determining whether the user-observable and user-predictable subspaces satisfy , , respectively.
We presume accurate mental models, correct design of the underlying automation, and a unimodal display (all information is of equal weight). We presume the user accesses information through the interface (and not from external sources), a reasonable assumption for aircraft instrument landings, remote operation of space vehicles, air traffic control, and other highly automated scenarios, but not, e.g., heads-up displays.
III. METHODS
We apply basic results from [5] and [7] to the case in which the input is partially unknown, and exploit the fact that switching scheme is known, as in [6] . As in [30] , we use projection matrices to remove the unknown elements and characterize the relevant observable subspaces.
We first define the discrete sets (similarly as in [4] ) so that is the set of all modes whose output is , is the set of all modes forward reachable through an event from any mode , and is the set of all modes backward reachable through an event from any mode . That is, is the set of modes which could occur after (prior to) to an event . We also define the Toeplitz matrices (as in [5] , [7] 
The continuous output and its derivatives are given by (4) with user input , user input derivatives , unknown input , and observability matrix . As in [2] and [30] , consider orthogonal projection matrices onto and onto , where the projection matrix onto the subspace is . Premultiplication by removes the unknown inputs due to the automation and other users from (4), and removes the unknown higher derivatives of the primary user's inputs (5) We first apply the notion of mode distinguishability from [5] , [7] to (5 The cardinality condition indicates that there is a unique initial mode with the output and from which the event occurs. The rank condition indicates that the discrete state can be uniquely determined from the continuous output. Modes before and after an unobservable event must have different discrete outputs to be detected, and if the cardinality conditions are true, there is only one state which can have the current output and is reachable through the last event, and one state which can have the last output and from which the next event can occur. The rank condition assures that modes for which this is not true can be determined uniquely from the continuous output.
Define the sets , , and (6) holds Proposition 4: User-observable and user-predictable subspaces. For all , define
and for all , define (8) where is the basis of and the user-observable element of the matrix transformed via and its orthogonal complement (see the Appendix) [2] . Then, the user-observable subspace is , and the user-predictable subspace is .then any current mode and next mode can be reconstructed. If in addition, and for all , then is user-observable and user-predictable. The user-interface to a system (1) is available for a given task if the task space satisfies and , and will solve Problem 1, since those states that are both user-observable and user-predictable can be reconstructed and their derivatives (6) reconstructed by the user. In other words, states relevant to the task can be observed and predicted by the user.
IV. EXAMPLES

A. Two-Pilot Control
The pilot (co-pilot) presses the 'Priority' button [ Fig. 1(a) ] to acquire commanding authority over manual flight controls. While standard procedure requires that the pilot not flying notify the pilot flying of intent to take over, this does not always occur (as in Air France Flight 447 [31] ).
We model the aircraft and flight management system as a hybrid system with modes , in which the modes describe who has authority over the controls: Pilot 1, Pilot 2, the autopilot, or shared authority between Pilot 1 and Pilot 2, respectively. The longitudinal dynamics are based on a linearized model of a B-747 in level flight at 40 000 feet traveling with a horizontal speed of 774 feet per second [32] , with state that describes deviations from the trim horizontal speed, angle of attack, pitch rate, and pitch angle, and input that is the elevator deflection . (9) Transitions between modes are dictated by pilot-initiated events , which represent Pilot 1 or Pilot 2 pressing the 'Priority' button on his respective sidestick controller [ Fig. 1(b) ]. Because the flight crew in the Air France Flight 447 accident [31] did not notify one another of the intent to take the controls, we presume that is annunciated but is not annunciated. Note that the cockpit visually obscures this action from the other pilot.
We presume a reference tracking controller is mode-dependent. The input from Pilot 1 is , the input from Pilot 2 is , and the automation-driven input is . Hence, for , , for , , for , , and for (used effectively in commercial jet aircraft when pilot inputs are of similar value). In mode, the reference input takes on the value immediately prior to transition into mode. The discrete output is , where and and the continuous output is . The initial state is . Proposition 2 shows that the system is initial state user-observable and user-predictable. However, Proposition 3 shows that because of the unobservable event , (7) is not met and Priority 1 and Dual Input are not distinguishable from discrete information alone. The rank conditions to distinguish mode from mode both fail on the second statement, hence the system is not current state user-predictable.
We note that Propositions 2 and 3 are sufficient but not necessary. For instance, when , the continuous output is consistent with the pilot's expectations regardless of the mode. The pilot can accurately predict the continuous state of the system, a nuance that Proposition 3 does not capture.
In contrast, when , , and (the pilot commands an ascent, and the copilot commands a descent), modes and are indistinguishable via the discrete information. Further, in mode, the continuous output is inconsistent with both pilot and copilot inputs, as neither the ascent command nor the descent command is executed. This leads to a kind of mode mismatch in which it is possible for the user to confuse all modes at once. A proposed solution is to alter the discrete outputs so that mode is explicitly indicated.
B. Air France 447
We model the system as in Fig. 3 , with pilot-initiated events (autopilot button), (autothrust button), and (flight director button) and automatic transitions , . We model the aircraft dynamics as in (11) but with inputs due to both elevator deflection and thrust , with input matrix (10) The continuous output , with flight path angle , and discrete output (Table II) are elements visible to the pilot (Fig. 2) . Table I summarizes control authority in each mode. A reference tracking feedback controller uses horizontal speed and the output associated with the goal for each mode (Table I) .
Several human-automation interaction problems occurred prior to an unrecoverable stall in the 2009 Air France Flight 447. Initially in mode to maintain steady and level fight at 35 000 ft, the aircraft transitioned into via the unobservable event when at least two of the aircraft's pitot tubes generated erroneous airspeed measurements and caused the autopilot and authrothrust to disconnect [31] . However, the flight director was still engaged, meaning that the crossbar indicators providing pitch, roll, or flightpath angle (Fig. 2) were based on erroneous data [31] , [33] . Further, the flight director was unavailable for short periods when all three speed measurements were invalid (however, the flight crew did not turn the flight director off [31] ). The pilot disengaged the autothrust, discontinuing the thrust lock function in . The aircraft remained in this mode until the end of the incident, without the flight crew's awareness of an unsafe attitude. Due to the control reconfiguration, transition into an out-of-trim (OOT) mode, in which the automation would take over control of the elevator if the aircraft was too close to the flight envelope boundary, was impossible. The crew caused a stall despite believing that they were operating the aircraft safely [31] .
These issues with mode confusion suggest that the system is not user-observable and user-predictable. Proposition 2 reveals that the initial mode fails discrete mode reconstruction from discrete information since , and from continuous information; however, since is full rank, the continuous initial state can be determined if the initial mode is known.
Proposition 3 shows that the system fails (7) because: 1) the discrete output is the same for some modes separated by an unobservable event,
; 2) so neither the current nor the next discrete mode can be determined from the discrete information alone; and 3) (8) reveals that the discrete mode cannot be distinguished via the continuous output, e.g., and , and and fail the second part of the rank condition. This result occurs for many other mode pairs in , suggesting that the discrete mode is extremely difficult to decipher via the continuous output for systems with many similar parameters and constant reference inputs. One possible solution to the lack of information available to the pilot for state reconstruction and prediction would be inclusion of the automation input in the pilot display.
Lastly, we again note that while useful in a basic assessment of information contained in the user-interface, Propositions 2 and 3 may not capture all interesting system phenomena. For instance, the higher derivatives of the input may be the most distinguishing characteristic of a given mode.
V. CONCLUSION
We present sufficient conditions for user-observability and user-predictability of collaborative linear hybrid systems, presuming user is a special type of observer with additional restrictions beyond a standard observer, and demonstrate their utility on two realistic flight management system examples.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: As in [7] (Definition 1) and [5] (Proposition 2), two modes are distinguishable so long as . Proof of Proposition 2: As in [4] (Proposition 1), with inclusion of rank condition for when unique determination of discrete mode is not possible from discrete output alone. The continuous state is uniquely determined if the rank conditions are satisfied for all mode pairs.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Here, we give a sketch of the proof, as in [7] (Lemma 1) and [4] (Proposition 1). The cardinality condition addresses the case in which the discrete mode is identifiable strictly from the discrete output and the next event. If cannot be reconstructed from discrete information, mode distinguishability via the rank conditions may be used. Once the discrete mode is determined, the continuous state can be uniquely identified only if the dynamics in that mode are observable.
Proof of Proposition 4: Discrete states are those for which the next mode can be reconstructed uniquely. Distinguishability of the next mode is assured for modes in via the continuous output. The continuous states whose derivative can be reconstructed are described by (10) and derived from the projection matrix approach (12) .
As in [2] , define a transformation matrix for each mode such that , with the basis of and the orthogonal complement of . Transform the state in mode to , with user-observable states and user-unobservable states as (11) Choose projection matrices onto , and onto , such that and . Hence, since (12) those state derivatives that can be reconstructed lie in and those states whose derivatives can be reconstructed lie in .
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